Spinoza et le problème de l’intentionnalité

Abstract

L'auteur propose une lecture de Spinoza à la lumière de la notion husserlienne d'intentionnalité.Il essaie de trouver un point commun aux deux systèmes afin de montrer la très grande originalité de la théorie de la vérité et de la signification de Spinoza qui rejette la primauté de la notion d'intentionnalité.ABSTRACT.-This article proposes to read Spinoza in light of Husserl's notion of intentionality.It tries to find a common ground between the two systems, in order to show that Spinoza's theory of truth and of sense is highly original in its implicit rejection of the primordiality of the notion of intentionality.

Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori: Elhanan Yakira (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Pubblicato in: Philosophiques, vol. 29, n. 1, pp. 139
Data di pubblicazione:01/01/2002
Editore:Erudit Consortium
Tipo di documento:Articolo
Lingua:francese
DOI: 10.7202/009569ar
ISSN:0316-2923, 1492-1391
Accesso aperto: Accesso aperto Bronze: lettura gratuita presso l'editore, senza licenza aperta – Philosophiques
Citazioni ricevute:3
Soggetti:
Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought (Social Sciences > Arts and Humanities > Philosophy)
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Social Sciences > Psychology > Experimental and Cognitive Psychology)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (Social Sciences > Psychology > Experimental and Cognitive Psychology)
Identificativi: OpenAlex W2156049942

Dati dell'indice centrale: OpenAlex (licenza CC0).

Descrizione
Riassunto:L'auteur propose une lecture de Spinoza à la lumière de la notion husserlienne d'intentionnalité.Il essaie de trouver un point commun aux deux systèmes afin de montrer la très grande originalité de la théorie de la vérité et de la signification de Spinoza qui rejette la primauté de la notion d'intentionnalité.ABSTRACT.-This article proposes to read Spinoza in light of Husserl's notion of intentionality.It tries to find a common ground between the two systems, in order to show that Spinoza's theory of truth and of sense is highly original in its implicit rejection of the primordiality of the notion of intentionality.
ISSN:0316-2923
1492-1391
DOI:10.7202/009569ar