Quali diritti sono veri diritti? Diritti sociali e diritti civili a confronto
Abstract
Whether social rights are genuine rights and whether they enjoy the same status as civil rights are controversial questions. As the essay suggests, rather than through conceptual and definitional arguments, similar questions should be addressed by investigating the normative implications of endorsing or, alternatively, rejecting the parity between social and civil rights. References to how they conceive individuals - as autonomous agents or as primarily characterized by needs and interests - enable to comparatively assess the contending positions. As the comparison shows, the position attributing priority to civil rights proves more convincing: it does not equate violations of civil rights and violations of social rights and it assigns rights with an intrinsic value, thus better vindicating their special normative force. The essay clarifies that this conclusion does not imply denying the value of the goods ordinarily guaranteed through social rights, which can be better and more fairly granted, as the essay contends, by a theory of justice focusing on redistributive duties, rather than by a theory of rights.
| Autori: | |
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| Pubblicato in: | Ragion pratica, vol. 2016, n. 47, pp. 553-564 |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 01/12/2016 |
| Tipo di documento: | Articolo |
| Lingua: | italiano |
| DOI: | 10.1415/84927 |
| Accesso aperto: | Nessuna copia ad accesso aperto nota: per le risorse in abbonamento usare Verifica disponibilità. |
| Soggetti: |
Political Philosophy and Ethics
(Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Political Science and International Relations)
Legal Rights and Human Rights
(Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Law)
Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies
(Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Political Science and International Relations)
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| Identificativi: | OpenAlex W2742105010 |
Dati dell'indice centrale: OpenAlex (licenza CC0).
| Riassunto: | Whether social rights are genuine rights and whether they enjoy the same status as civil rights are controversial questions. As the essay suggests, rather than through conceptual and definitional arguments, similar questions should be addressed by investigating the normative implications of endorsing or, alternatively, rejecting the parity between social and civil rights. References to how they conceive individuals - as autonomous agents or as primarily characterized by needs and interests - enable to comparatively assess the contending positions. As the comparison shows, the position attributing priority to civil rights proves more convincing: it does not equate violations of civil rights and violations of social rights and it assigns rights with an intrinsic value, thus better vindicating their special normative force. The essay clarifies that this conclusion does not imply denying the value of the goods ordinarily guaranteed through social rights, which can be better and more fairly granted, as the essay contends, by a theory of justice focusing on redistributive duties, rather than by a theory of rights. |
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| DOI: | 10.1415/84927 |